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Abstract 
This editorial to the special issue of RiL dedicated to relevance theory and problems of 
intercultural communication addresses the general requirements that a theory of 
communication must meet to be applicable to the analysis of intercultural communication. 
Then it discusses criticism levelled against Grice’s theory of conversational implicature 
and Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness on the grounds that these theories were not 
universal enough to be applied to all data. Finally, it offers some remarks on the 
applicability of relevance theory to intercultural pragmatics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The five papers included in this special issue employ the analytic tools of 
relevance theory to deal with topics related to intercultural communication in 
various ways. The first two papers focus on comprehension phenomena: Manuel 
Padilla Cruz’s contribution “Interlocutors-related and hearer-specific causes of 
misunderstanding: Processing strategy, confirmation bias and weak vigilance” 
offers a comprehensive study of misunderstandings, discussing its various 
possible causes and mechanisms, and listing intercultural factors among them, 
whereas Mai Zaki’s paper “The pragmatics of Arabic religious posts on 
Facebook: a relevance-theoretic account” analyses Facebook posts uploaded by 
Muslim users. The next three papers undertake translation problems (which are 
inherently and invariably intercultural): Izabela Szymańska addresses the effects 
of employing various translation strategies and techniques to render dialectal 
variation occurring within a novel (“The treatment of geographical dialect in 
literary translation from the perspective of relevance theory”, Monica Vasileanu 
reflects upon translation strategy adopted in the English version of an 18th-
century treatise by the Romanian scholar Demetrius Cantemir (“What was a 
relevant translation in the 18th century?”) and Edyta Źrałka deals with a case of 
deliberate manipulation in translation across a political border in the communist 
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era (“Principles of Newspeak in Polish translations of British and American 
press articles under communist rule”). 
The question that I would like to address in this editorial concerns the strong 
points and potential challenges relevance theory could face when applied to 
intercultural pragmatics. To this end, I shall first refer to the critical discussions 
that revolved around Grice’s (1989a[1975]) theory of conversation and Brown 
and Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness, challenging their claims to 
universality on the grounds that some data coming from non-European 
languages and cultures do not conform to the patterns offered by these models. 
My sole aim in revisiting the polemics on Grice and Brown/Levinson is to use it 
as illustration of the general question of what kind of argument it takes to allege 
that a pragmatic theory is of limited scope: on the one hand, it is natural for such 
theories to gain empirical validity from the observation of real data, but on the 
other, data coming from other linguistic and cultural settings may potentially 
undermine their foundations. In the final part of the paper I shall turn to the 
question of the intercultural potential of RT, linking it with the cognitive basis of 
the theory. 
 
 
2. A challenge to cooperativeness as a necessary condition for 
communicating conversational implicatures  
 
When putting forward his ground-breaking theory of implicature, H.P. Grice 
(1989a[1975]) did not state explicitly that the mechanism he offered for 
explaining inferential communication, i.e. the Cooperative Principle and the four 
categories of maxims (Quality, Quantity, Relation and Manner) were to be 
applicable across languages and cultures. His standpoint can be however inferred 
from the following legitimisation for the Cooperative Principle:  
 
…observance of the Cooperative Principle and the maxims is reasonable (rational) […]: 
anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as 
giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be 
expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk 
exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general 
accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. (Grice 1989a: 29-30)  
 
By making an appeal to reasonable or rational behaviour, this fragment lends 
support to the view that Grice did have a claim to universality for his model. 
Also in other parts of his essays he invoked every-day experience of non-verbal 
transactions between human beings to further corroborate the idea that most 
human exchanges have rational basis and are characterised by cooperativeness, 
even if understood weakly as mutually accepted direction. It has to be noted 
though that Grice’s postulate is not about the universality of cooperativeness per 
se, but about cooperativeness being a principle underlying the occurrence of all 
 Relevance Theory and Intercultural Communication Problems 3 
 
conversational implicatures. It is thus admitted that the speaker “… may opt out 
from the operation both of the maxim and of the Cooperative Principle, he may 
say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the 
way the maxim requires” (1989a: 30), in which case no implicatures will be 
communicated. To challenge Grice’s theory it would be therefore necessary to 
demonstrate that either no implicatures arise despite presumed cooperativeness 
(and context favouring them), or that implicatures do arise despite speakers 
being overtly uncooperative. 
A challenge of this kind came from Elinor Ochs Keenan’s (1976) 
examination of conversational practices of the Malagasy people, who apparently 
fail to observe one of the Quantity Maxims by which the speaker is expected to 
provide information required by an interlocutor. As reported by Ochs Keenan, 
Malagasy speakers standardly answer questions in a way that in a Western 
society would implicate lack of knowledge (e.g. “Where is your mother?” “At 
home or in the market”), despite being able to provide a precise answer. In a 
similar way, they avoid using referring expressions that would immediately and 
uniquely identify the referent and choose to refer e.g. to one’s sister as “a girl” 
instead (cf. Ochs Keenan 1976: 73). Again, this corresponds to the well-known 
example “X is meeting a woman this evening” discussed by Grice (1989a: 37), 
where a generalised conversational implicature arises due to the use of the 
indefinite article “a”. As explained by Ochs Keenan, the conversational conduct 
of Malagasy speakers is not motivated by their wish to violate or opt out of a 
conversational maxim, but it is dictated by general norms holding in this society, 
such as the norm to avoid tsiny, i.e. guilt for explicit naming a culprit (Ochs 
Keenan 1976: 70), or a norm that prescribes avoidance of antagonising ancestral 
spirits. 
Despite demonstrating that the Quantity maxims are constrained by general 
social and religious rules in the Malagasy society and therefore do not give rise 
to implicatures in contexts in which they would do so in Western cultures, Ochs 
Keenan does not attempt to undermine the validity of the Gricean model. As she 
rightly points out, the Maxims may be likewise constrained in the Western 
world, where speakers also withhold some information for cultural, moral or 
politeness reasons (which Grice 1989a himself had also predicted). Concluding 
her paper, Keenan in fact proposes that Grice’s framework can be used in cross-
cultural studies for comparing how particular maxims are employed (or 
bypassed) by various groups in various settings. 
Another challenge against Grice’s model came from Sperber and Wilson’s 
(1995: 273-275) analysis of situations in which implicatures are communicated 
by manifestly uncooperative speakers. Interestingly, although the dialogue 
illustrating Sperber and Wilson’s argument was supposedly carried out by two 
British speakers planning a trip to France, it is in some respects similar to the 
Malagasy examples discussed by Ochs Keenan, as it involves a speaker 
choosing to withhold sensitive information to herself (albeit for personal, not 
societal reasons). For the sake of balance, let us note that a Gricean pragmatist 
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could possibly reply to this criticism by saying that cooperativeness does not 
involve a speaker’s obligation to reveal everything she knows and that the very 
act of participating in a conversation is cooperative enough (cf. also Grice 1989, 
strand 6). 
It would be beyond the scope and objective of this paper to weigh all the 
arguments in this polemics. What is relevant for our current topic is the fact that 
a pragmatic model whose claims to empirical validity and universality were at 
least partly based on observations of what is considered reasonable and rational 
in the Western world (vis. Grice’s examples of verbal exchanges and actions), 
turned out to be vulnerable to challenges when cross-cultural (or alternative) 
data were brought forth. Even if these new facts did not undermine the 
foundations of the model, they indicated that the maxims or perhaps the 
cooperative principle need to be calibrated to culture-specific or situation 
specific requirements, thereby making them relative rather than universal.  
 
 
3. A challenge to the universality of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory 
 
Brown and Levinson (1987) based their theory of politeness on the concept of 
face, introduced into social studies by Goffman (1967). They developed a 
descriptive model distinguishing a number of linguistic strategies oriented 
towards the positive or negative face of the addressee. Major criticism levelled 
against Brown and Levinson’s theory (for detailed discussion see e.g. Trosborg 
1994; Goldsmith 2006) centred on the notion of face: although it was 
acknowledged to be subject to cultural specification, it could still be considered 
not universal enough to be applicable to all cultures.  
Most challenges against Brown and Levinson’s (henceforth: B&L) model 
were raised by researchers dealing with Asian cultures, e.g. Ide (1989) or 
Matsumoto (1988), according to whom this account fails to recognize the role of 
formal linguistic devices, such as honorifics, in languages in which they play a 
crucial role. In Japanese, for instance, the speaker has to identify his/her place 
with respect to other individuals and behave accordingly, both verbally and non-
verbally. In this culture, politeness then consists in observing conventions rather 
than choosing a strategy (this distinction is sometimes referred to as that 
between “discernment” and “volition”[Ide 1989]). Let us consider an example 
for illustration: 
 
(1)  Kyoo wa doyoobi da.  
today TOPIC Saturday COPULA-PLAIN  
Today is Saturday.   
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(2)  Kyoo wa doyoobi desu.  
today TOPIC Saturday COPULA-POLITE  
Today is Saturday. (Matsumoto, 1988: 415) 
 
The difference between (1) and (2) lies in the use of a different copula – plain in 
(1) and marked for politeness in (2). A speaker of Japanese would choose (1) or 
(2) depending on the formality of the situation and relation to an interlocutor. 
Much as for a Western speaker a failure to apply a polite register when required 
would be seen as a face-threatening act, for a Japanese speaker uttering (1) does 
not seem to pose a threat to the hearer’s face. Consequently, using (2) instead of 
(1) cannot be seen as a redress strategy. According to Matsumoto (1988) then, 
the linguistically coded character of Japanese politeness renders its analysis in 
terms of face-threatening and face-saving acts inadequate. In this way, B&L’s 
reliance on the notion of face stemming from their Western bias undermines the 
universality of their theory.  
The last word in this discussion did not come from critics of B&L, but from 
their defendants, as counterarguments to Ide and Matsumoto’s objections were 
given by e.g. Fukada and Asato (2004), who claim that if the vertical and 
hierarchical structure of Japanese society is taken into account, B&L’s theory 
holds. Once again then, the consideration of cross-linguistic data have inspired 
questions about the universality of a pragmatic theory, suggesting the need to 
calibrate the postulated principles to specific linguistic and/or cultural 
conditions.  
To maintain analogy to the previous section, in which critical points raised by 
relevance theorists were reported, let me mention that B&L’s theory was also 
challenged from a relevance-theoretic perspective (cf. Escandell-Vidal 1996, 
1998, 2004; Jary 1998). The main objection formulated in these papers was that 
contrary to B&L’s postulate, in most situations politeness may not be 
communicated, let alone implicated. Speakers who choose to express themselves 
adequately to their social position vis-a-vis other interlocutors may not wish to 
communicate the assumption that they are being polite, as such an assumption 
may be not be part of their informative intention (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29). 
This objection, though put forward on other than intercultural grounds, also 
undermines the universality of the B&L model by pointing out that it applies 
only to some cases of politeness, i.e. those in which it is overtly intended to be 
communicated by the speaker1. 
  
                                                          
1  Nowadays, the distinction between communicated and non-communicated politeness is 
generally recognized in politeness studies, at least partially following the work by Escandell-
Vidal and Jary. 
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4. RT as a model of communication based on cognitive psychology 
 
Unlike the Gricean paradigm or B&L’s theory of politeness, RT does not 
presuppose any culture-dependent notion (such as cooperativeness or face) to 
explain how speaker’s meaning is communicated. This theory was developed as 
the first comprehensive model of pragmatics that made parallel claims about 
communication and cognition, the latter being normally considered universal. 
Hence, the communicative principle of relevance, given in (2) below, postulated 
to govern utterance comprehension is firmly grounded in the more general 
cognitive principle of relevance (1) describing how human being make sense of 
all stimuli surrounding them:  
 
(1)  Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. 
(2)  Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal 
relevance, (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 260)  
 
where relevance for an individual is understood as obtaining cognitive benefits, 
such as increments in, or reorganisation of knowledge, at justifiable processing 
cost.  
For Sperber and Wilson, the cognitive principle of relevance has evolutionary 
basis. They view cognition as a biological function, and particular cognitive 
mechanisms as adaptations, which have evolved subject to the Darwinian natural 
selection and other evolutionary forces. Such forces produced pressure towards 
cost-benefit optimization, favouring mechanism variants “that performed better 
at the time than other variants that were around” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 
262), which could involve a qualitative or quantitative advantages. In this way, 
cognitive mechanisms have become specialized for making the most of the 
resources available for carrying out various tasks, i.e. for optimizing relevance. 
Although these mechanism vary greatly with respect to the kind of inputs they 
take and tasks they perform, it is claimed that the pursuit for optimal relevance is 
a single universal principle that underscores the operation of all the cognitive 
mechanisms.  
The mechanism responsible for inferential communication is just one of 
them. At the same time, it has its own distinct characteristics, as the existence of 
a separate communicative principle of relevance indicates. What is special about 
the inferential communication mechanism, known as the comprehension 
module, is that it processes stimuli that are intentionally used by communicators, 
and therefore they can be presumed (and not merely expected) to bring about 
some cognitive benefits. Still, the fact that such benefits are presumed does not 
mean that they are guaranteed – the comprehension mechanism relies on a 
heuristic rather than a fail-safe algorithm. Relevance theory is thus concerned 
with describing the universal principle governing comprehension together with 
risk inherently associated with it, the risk being dependent on individual-related 
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or cultural factors (cf. also Padilla Cruz, this volume) or on the operation of 
other mental systems. 
As has been emphasized, the two principles of relevance do not draw on any 
observations of how human beings behave or interact with one another in a 
specific sociocultural setting. This is not to say that every human being will 
interpret an utterance or another stimulus in the same way, or that cultural 
background does not affect the way relevance is established. On the contrary, 
specific cultural assumptions brought to the interpretation process may have a 
vital influence on its outcome. When Maria is asked if she knows anything about 
Pedro, a new colleague employed in her company, and replies “He had pork 
chops for lunch”, her utterance will give rise to different cognitive effects 
depending on who her interlocutors are: for vegetarians, the utterance might be 
relevant in virtue of the implication “Pedro is not a vegetarian”, for Muslims it 
might be relevant in virtue of the implication “Pedro is not a Muslim”, for 
individuals who do not find anything special about eating pork, the only relevant 
implication might be that all Maria knows about Pedro is what she observed in 
the canteen during lunchtime, i.e. she does not know anything interesting about 
his character or past (to keep this example simple for illustrative purposes, the 
implications discussed are those that hearers have arrived at largely on their own 
responsibility).  
How about situations in which speakers employ specific linguistic formulas 
to carry out culturally sanctioned speech acts, such as “I pronounce you man and 
wife” or “One notrump”? Relevance theory naturally recognizes the fact that 
some forms of communication require institutional frames to be effectively 
performed and treats these frames as external to the study of communication 
proper: describing institutional communicative acts, claim Sperber and Wilson 
(1995: chapter 4.10), is a task that belongs to the study of the institutions 
involved (or, one could add, to the study of society in general). 
The picture sketched above of the division of labour between universal and 
specific factors employed in the theoretical apparatus of RT (or situated beyond 
it) indicates that data from intercultural communication should not pose a threat 
to this account. This is so since the variety of cultural norms or linguistic 
conventions is accommodated in the model as the variety of inputs to the 
operation of the comprehension module, resulting in a predicted variety of 
communication practice around the globe. As pointed out by Wilson (2015), to 
challenge RT on intercultural grounds, it would be necessary to demonstrate that 
either the Cognitive or Communicative Principle of Relevance (or both) are not 
universal, e.g. by proving that some groups of humans attend to stimuli that are 
new but irrelevant or that they process utterances seeking literally true and not 
optimally relevant interpretations. As of today, no indications to this effect have 
been found. On the contrary, empirical studies have confirmed the universality 
of both principles: Van der Henst, Sperber and  Politzer (2002) demonstrate that 
when faced with standard reasoning tasks, such as determinate and indeterminate 
relational problems, subjects derive conclusions backed by considerations of 
8 Agnieszka Piskorska 
 
relevance rather than by purely logical rules, i.e. they seek answers which are 
relevant and not merely true (and irrelevant); other studies on reasoning tasks 
reported by Van der Henst and Sperber (2004) provide further evidence for that; 
and the study by Van der Henst, Carles and Sperber (2002) offers evidence 
supporting empirical validity of the communicative principle of relevance on the 
speech production side. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper RT has been depicted as a pragmatic theory that sets realistic 
objectives for the account of communication it proposes, delimiting its scope to 
inferential processes occurring in the human mind. These processes are driven 
by search for relevance, i.e. optimization of the cognitive effects obtained 
against processing cost incurred. Although routes to achieving optimal relevance 
for the same utterance may vary across contexts and speakers, and indeed be 
influenced by systematic cultural factors, the Communicative Principle of 
Relevance is believed to be universal.  
This standpoint leaves open the possibility of using the relevance-theoretic 
apparatus jointly with any set of institutionalized or culturally conditioned rules 
of communication, such as, for instance, the social and moral norms governing 
the conduct of Malagasy speakers, Facebook etiquette or conventions on writing 
emails by students to university staff. At the same time, unlike pragmatic 
approaches that seek their legitimization in conforming to observable patterns of 
behaviour, the relevance-theoretic approach is free from limitations that social 
constructs, inevitably reflected in such patterns, could impose.  
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